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Abstract: The study aims to identify the institutional flaws of the cur-
rent EU waste management model by analysing the economic model of 
‘extended producer responsibility’ and collective waste management systems 
and to create a model for measuring the transaction costs borne by waste 
recovery organizations. The model was approbated by analysing the Bulgarian 
collective waste management systems that have been complying with the EU 
legislation for the last 10 years. The analysis focuses on waste oils because of 
their economic importance and the limited number of studies and analyses in 
this field as the predominant body of research to date has mainly addressed 
packaging waste, mixed household waste or discarded electrical and electronic 
equipment. The study aims to support the process of establishing a ‘circular 
economy’ in the EU, which was initiated in 2015.   
Keywords: circular economy, transaction costs, institutional flaws, 
extended producer responsibility, collective waste management systems. 
JEL: L14, Q53.  
 
 
t the end of 2015 the European Union made considerable efforts to 
change its economic model with a proposal for legislative changes 
aiming to create a ‘circular economy’ (COM/2015/0595). The grounds 
for and objectives of the proposal were to increase resource efficiency, to 
reduce public waste disposal costs, and to improve health and environmental 
policies.  
In 2011 The European Commission published a short list of raw 
materials (e.g. tungsten, beryllium, germanium, etc.) that are strategic for the 
European economy (COM/2011/0025). The list shows that the sources of im-
ports of these raw materials are exclusively from non-EU countries. The incre-
ased price volatility on the international commodity markets and the frequent 
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political changes in these countries pose a high risk to the European economy. 
At the same time these elements are present in household waste generated on 
the territory of the EU. These facts have led to increased calls for policy 
responses to improve waste management as particularly important for achie-
ving high economic growth based on innovative technologies that require 
scarce resources.  
The ‘extended producer responsibility’ principle (Directive 2008/ 
98/EC, Art. 8) is an important economic instrument in the field of waste 
management. One of the ways of its implementation is through establishment 
of ‘collective waste management systems’, which combine the efforts of many 
producers, dealers, and importers of waste-generating products. These joint 
efforts aim to reduce the financial burden borne by the companies and at the 
same time to improve public wealth by reducing the waste flows and improving 
the efficiency of their management.  
The model was adopted in 2008 (Directive 2008/98/EC) and has been 
in force for already ten years but its effects are controversial. The explanatory 
memorandum of the circular economy proposal quoted above states that an 
additional 600 million tons of EU-generated waste could be recycled or reused. 
This quantity is about 25% of the total waste, which pollutes the environment 
and could be a source of important secondary raw materials for the economy. 
The inefficient utilization of waste on the one hand and the depletion of the 
available natural resource on a global scale are sufficient grounds for scientific 
research in this field. 
The aim of this paper is to identify the reasons for the low efficiency of 
the European waste management model by means of institutional economy 
methods and to propose a model for measuring the transaction costs of 
collective waste management systems.  
The study focuses on collective waste recovery systems based on the 
principle of extended producer responsibility. The scope of the study was 
reduced to include only the streams of waste oils and other petroleum products 
because of the great diversity of waste types. Another reason for narrowing the 
scope is the small number of analyzes specifically related to this waste stream. 
Most scientific publications focus on packaging waste and mixed household 
waste. The study is limited to the territory of Bulgaria as an EU Member State, 
but the conclusions could be used for any of the other European countries.  
The results of the study may be used to improve the efficiency of the 
current waste management system and provide more valuable raw materials for 
the economy. They may also be used to optimize the economic instruments of 
the new legislation for transition to a ‘circular economy’ and avoid the flaws of 
the current model.  
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1. Literature Review  
 
Despite the little time that has elapsed since the publication of the cir-
cular economy proposal of the European Commission in 2015, there are already 
quite a few scientific publications related to it. One of the latest is by Richard 
Hughes (2017). It reviews the current regulatory institutional environment in 
which the circular economy should develop. A key conclusion regarding the 
new element of this environment is that the regulations of the EU would not be 
effective without establishing official technical standards for their imple-
mentation. These would allow for a strict control and would eliminate the 
opportunities for different interpretations of the EU regulations by the different 
Member States as is currently the case. Hughes’ publication (2017) does not 
include a detailed analysis of the principle of extended producer responsibility 
and does not specifically address collective waste recovery systems and 
therefore does not coincide with the purpose and methodology of this study.  
An analysis of the economic significance of the circular economy model 
is included in the publication of Ying and Li-jun (2011). The paper provides a 
detailed comparison between green supply chain management and traditional 
supply chain management. According to the authors, traditional supply chain 
management is based on the classic concept of profit maximization as the 
company's primary goal, which excludes any increase of green management 
costs. However, they believe that the companies with green supply chain mana-
gement can have competitive advantages. First of all, rising the green con-
sumption awareness of the market environment (through media, schools, etc.) 
and explaining its benefits to society will result in higher demand for the pro-
ducts of the companies with green management. The second advantage is seen 
as establishment of green corporate culture through more rigorous public 
control over the adherence to environmental regulations and raising corporate 
employees’ awareness of the benefits from a green image of their company. 
The third advantage is the establishment of strategic cooperation for long-term 
supply only with green management suppliers and avoidance of traditional 
management suppliers. The fourth advantage is seen as improvement of the 
international image of the country and, accordingly, a higher demand for the 
products of export-oriented companies. The quoted publication of Ying et al. 
(2011) does not provide a detailed analysis of the principle of extended 
producer responsibility and does not specifically address collective waste 
recovery systems and therefore does not duplicate the aim and methodology of 
this study.  
The extended producer responsibility and collective waste recovery 
systems are addressed in a number of publications but none of them duplicates 
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this study in terms of objectives, methodology, and conclusions. One such pa-
per was published by M. Dubois (2012). It summarizes a number of previous 
publications on the issue and addresses extended producer responsibility by 
highlighting some criticisms of weak incentives for waste prevention and 
recycling. These critical conclusions are related to static goals and the lack of 
sufficient economic instruments or coordination thereof. According to the 
author waste recycling or recovery can be stimulated by levying taxes on 
collective systems for uncollected waste fractions or on producers for the use 
of primary natural resources in their production process. He also believes that 
large subsidies for separate collection reduce incentives for ecodesign of 
products, which limits the potential waste at the stage of product design.  
Dubois (2012) discusses collective waste management systems as well. 
He believes that they provide opportunities for minimization of producers’ 
transaction costs. The author points out that the main disadvantage of these 
systems is the flat-rate contribution for the recovery of different types of 
products (e.g. refrigerators) at the end of its life cycle regardless of the different 
quantities of materials used for their production, which does not stimulate 
ecodesign.  
As far as Dubois (2012) only notes that transaction costs can be 
considered a waste management instrument, they are viewed in relation to the 
cost of monitoring of illegal waste disposal. The costs incurred from collusions 
among between the participants within the collective waste management 
systems may be defined as social costs.  
Transaction costs for waste management are also indirectly referred to 
by other authors, such as Calcott and Walls (2005). They define transaction 
costs as one of the many elements of a general equilibrium model of production, 
consumption, recycling and landfilling. However, they associate these costs 
only with the effect of taxes and subsidies related to waste management. They 
believe that in a market-oriented model the transaction costs would be much 
higher than in the tax and subsidy model. Transaction costs for waste 
management are considered in a similar way by Shinkuma (2007) and Ino 
(2011).  
 
 
2. Structural analysis of transaction costs in collective waste 
recovery systems  
 
This analysis of the structure of transaction costs in collective waste 
recovery systems is based on the model of transaction costs structure for 
collective waste recovery systems introduced by Coggan, Whitten and Bennett 
(2010), which defines the characteristics of the transaction for the 
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environmental good, the nature of the transactors, and the current institutional 
environment. Although this model is aimed primarily towards environmental 
policy selection and enforcement by governmental institutions, it can be used 
as a foundation and modified for the purposes of our analysis.   
Transaction Characteristics  
General definition of transaction. According to the Directive on Waste 
(Directive 2008/98/EC, Art. 21, Para. 3), waste oils ‘regeneration’ is given pri-
ority as a method for their recovery.2 Regeneration of waste oils is defined in 
the same Directive (Directive 2008/98/EC, Art. 3, Para. 18) as ‘any recycling 
operation whereby base oils can be produced by refining waste oils.’3  The 
resulting ‘base oils’ cease to be waste (Directive 2008/98/EC, Art. 6, Para. 1) 
and become raw materials for production of engine oils, gearbox oils, and other 
industrial oils intended for sale. Therefore, the product (base oils) from rege-
neration of waste oils is a commodity with economic value and the resulting 
market price. Thus the object of the analysed transaction is waste in the begin-
ning of the transaction and a commodity at the end of the transaction. 
The institutional features of a transaction will be defined in terms of the 
specific characteristics of the assets, the frequency and the duration of the 
transaction.  
First we shall analyse the specific characteristics of the assets. 
Using the definition of Williamson (1996), the specific characteristics 
of transaction assets are defined as relatively high. The recovery of waste oils 
in Bulgaria through regeneration is carried out only by two enterprises, which 
have the necessary utilities and permits. This process requires sophisticated 
utilities and highly qualified staff, which requires large initial investments. It 
also requires a lot of time for obtaining the various required permits (e.g. IPPC 
permit under the Environment Protection Law). The regeneration process 
requires specific inputs (e.g. additives) and activities (Directive 2008/98 / EC, 
art. 21, para. 3). These specific characteristics of the asset increase the associa-
ted transaction costs.  
Secondly, we shall analyse transaction frequency and duration. The 
specific characteristics of the asset determine to a large extent the frequency 
and duration of the transaction. In terms of statutory procedures (Law on Waste 
                                                          
2 The provisions of the Directive were transposed in Bulgaria’s legislation with Art. 3 
of the Ordinance on Waste Oils and Waste Oil Products /NOMON/. Regeneration priority is 
imposed in the IPPC permit of each subcontractor. According to Art. 28, Para. 1, item 2 of the 
Ordinance /NOMON/ when subcontractors are issued IPPC permits according to Chapter 
Seven, Section II of the  Environment Protection Law (EPL) (the predominant case), they are 
legally obliged to regenerate the waste oils.  
3  These provisions of the Directive were transposed in Bulgaria’s legislation with §1, 
Item 2 and Item 22 of the Ordinance /NOMON/.  
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Management, 2012, Art. 18), the transaction is carried out once a year and lasts 
throughout the year. The duration is determined by the large quantities to be 
collected and processed (40% of the oils and petroleum products sold on the 
national market). On the one hand, the transaction is recurring, which implies 
accumulation of experience and establishment of detailed contractual docu-
mentation by the transactors. On the other hand, the transaction is associated 
with large amounts of a specific asset with a long life cycle. Both factors require 
a complex monitoring process. The transaction is also affected by third parties 
(the government, NGOs) that control the process or are interested in its 
monitoring. Their behavior is difficult to predict by the main contractors - the 
contracting authority and the processor. Therefore, the frequency and duration 
of the transaction do not have a significant effect on the amount of transaction 
costs.  
Transactor Characteristics   
General characteristics of collective waste recovery systems. 
Collective waste recovery systems operate under the conditions of publicly 
available resources, which entails an obligation for these systems to comply 
with the principle of public efficiency in their activities. Although they are 
registered as companies under the commercial legislation, the requirements for 
their registration in Bulgaria are set out in the Law on Waste Management 
(2012), which substantially alters their character as a classical commercial 
company.4 They are prohibited to share profits, to issue bonds and stocks with 
dividend coupons, and to grant loans and guarantee loans to third parties as well 
as take promissory liabilities and issue bearer shares.5  Moreover, they cannot 
be transformed.6 According to the provisions of the Law on Waste Manage-
ment, they cannot carry out activities other than to manage and/or indepen-
dently carry out the activities of separate collection, recycling and recovery of 
widespread waste.  
In reality, all businesses work for profit and are not subject to restric-
tions by the Law on Commerce and although the collective recovery systems 
are registered as business organizations, they are only allowed to carry out 
certain environmental activities for public benefit. The non-distribution of pro-
fits and all other restrictions rank these systems closer to the non-governmental 
                                                          
4 See Art.16, item 3, Art.17, Para.1 and Para. 2, §1, item 16 of the SP of the Law on 
Waste Management (2012). 
5  They are prohibited to share profits, to issue bonds and stocks with dividend coupons, 
and to grant loans and guarantee loans to third parties as well as take promissory liabilities and 
issue bearer shares. 
6 They cannot be transformed by consolidation, merger, division, separation of the 
privately owned company or transfer of all assets of the sole shareholder except in cases of 
consolidation or merger of utilization organizations. 
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organizations, and their environmental goals, combined with the prohibition to 
work for profit, identify them as organizations for public benefit. This implies 
that all activities of the collective recovery systems must comply with the of 
public effectiveness principle.   
Transactors’ specific characteristics are defined in terms of their limited 
rationality and opportunism.  
Transactors’ limited rationality is related to the complexity of the prob-
lems they have resolve and the volume of information they have to analyse 
(Coggan et al. 2010). The specific characteristics of the asset subject to this 
specific transaction presume complex problems and large volumes of infor-
mation the transactors have to deal with. In the context of constant changes to 
waste regulations at national and European level, transactors’ behavior has to 
be adjusted  frequently. Transactors need time to become familiar with and gain 
experience on the revised regulatory requirements. At the same time the 
extremely small number of employees (two employees on average) of the 
Bulgarian collective systems for utilization of waste oils limits the capacity of 
these organizations to adapt to rapid changes in their business environment 
when they have to process large volumes of technical and regulatory infor-
mation and they are more likely to make wrong decisions and this increase their 
transaction costs.   
Transactors’ opportunism is defined as transactors’ possibility to take 
advantage of false information, withheld information, or flaws in the system of 
monitoring (Falconer and Saunders, 2002). The specific physical characterris-
tics of the asset hinders control over the processes for collection and regene-
ration of waste oils and their conversion into base oils as well over any possible 
follow-up operations with such oils. On the other hand, the limited administ-
rative capacity of the contracting entity (collective system) does not allow for 
on-site control over the contractor. These characteristics create opportunities 
for objective misinformation of the contracting authority, and contractors can 
take opportunistic advantage in order to maximize their profit from the 
transaction. Moreover, the contracting parties do not share common values. In 
terms of their organisation, collective utilisation  systems are similar to NGOs 
because the scope of their operations is limited by the environmental legislation 
and they are not allowed to share profit while the contractors are commercial 
companies established for  profit maximization profits and operating in a 
duopoly with potential for market domination.  
Uncertainty of the current institutional environment  
EU waste management directives do not specify a model of collective 
systems that shall be uniformly applied across all member states as each state 
shall stipulate in its national legislation (European Commission, 2012) how to 
achieve the goals set by the EU. The general waste oils management rules for 
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are set out in the Waste Framework Directive (Directive 2008/98/EC, Art. 3, 
Para. 3, 18; Art. 21.)7 According to the Bulgarian legislation (Law on Waste 
Management (2012), Art. 14), collective waste utilization systems have two 
options – either to perform their duties individually, provided that they have the 
necessary capacity to do so, or to perform their duties through collective sys-
tems after signing a contract with utilization organizations possessing the 
required permits. 
None of the Bulgarian collective systems dealing with waste oils has 
created its own capacity throughout the studied period (2007-2017). According 
to data from the Commercial Register (2017), the average value of their 
tangible fixed assets (TFA) is EUR 2000 with the highest value being EUR 
8 000, which indicates zero technical capacity. This is why all Bulgarian 
collective waste oil systems apply the second option by entering into contracts 
with subcontractors - commercial companies with the respective capacity and 
permits. These contracts have standard general terms and are concluded in 
terms of the current market conditions and prices.   
A major problem with those standard contracts is the vague definition 
of their subject matter (the purpose and outcome of the performance.)  
Typically, the subject matter of such a contract is defined as: the 
contracting authority assigns and the contractor undertakes to carry out 
activities for collection, transportation, storage and utilisation of waste oils in 
accordance with the Ordinance on Waste Oils and Waste Oil Products  (NO-
MON, 2013). The key issue for clarifying the subject matter of such a contract 
and the due performance by the subcontractor is the definition of the said 
‘utilisation  of waste-waste oils’.  
The established practice in Bulgaria for the last ten years has been for 
contractors to issue written statements to the contracting authority (collective 
system) that hey have fulfilled their contractual obligation to utilize the quantity 
of waste stipulated for in their contracts. This statement is then submitted by 
the collective system to the Ministry of Environment and Water. On the 
grounds of this evidence and an accompanying audit report the ministry 
exempts the members of the collective system from paying a product fee to the 
state budget (Waste Management Act 2012, Art. 59, para. 3). Exemption shall 
be effected by an official order of the Minister, which is published in a special 
registry of the Ministry of Environment and Water. The order to the Minister 
of Environment and Water completes the contractual relations between the 
collective system and the contractor who has issued the statement and the 
contractor is paid for the rendered services.   
                                                          
7 The Framework Directive (Directive 2008/98/EC) stipulates that waste oils are a 
sensitive waste group and that member states shall report periodically information on the 
management of waste oil to the Commission (Art. 28, para. 3 (b); Art. 37).  
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Therefore, the fulfilment of the contract obligation for recovery of waste 
oils by the contractor (a company that has the necessary facilities and permits)  
is proved only on the grounds of the statement issued by the same contractor. 
The contracting authority (a collective waste recovery system does not have 
such facilities) submits this statement to the ministry as a proof that it has ful-
filled its environmental obligations and has to pay the contractual price to the 
contractor. 
At the same time, the contractor owns the product from the recovery 
process (base oil) and sells it to third parties as a market commodity. Thus the 
collective system pays both the raw material and the production costs for the 
resulting base oil to the contractor who receives the entire profit from the final 
product at no virtually no cost. This opportunism results from vague insti-
tutional rules, generates losses of public welfare, and forms a certain social cost. 
 
3. A model for measuring the transaction costs borne by collective 
waste recovery systems 
 
The model for measuring the transaction costs in the operation of 
collective waste recovery systems is based on the structural analysis described 
in the previous section and the model proposed by Collins and Fabozzi (1991). 
For our purposes their model was modified substantially because it was 
intended to measure the cost of financial (stock) transactions and its deter-
minants do not meet the requirements of the environmental economics. We 
have added a second level to the model, which will take into account the social 
public costs (the impact on public welfare)associated with the measured 
transaction costs. The new model includes the following variables: 
Social Public Costs (SPC) = the quantity of regenerated waste oil with 
collective systems – the quantity of regenerated waste oil without collective 
systems. 
 
Transaction Costs (ТrС) = Fixed Costs (FtrC) + Variable Costs (VtrC). 
 
FtrC = Administrative fixed costs + Market fixed costs. 
 
Administrative fixed costs = costs associated with the bank guarantee 
required for the permit + costs associated with the annual performance audits 
+ costs for keeping the required control documentation and assistance during 
inspections from the public control bodies. 
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Market fixed costs = costs associated with the control over contractor’s 
performance + costs associated with the communication among the members 
of the collective system. 
 
VtrC = Performance costs + Alternative costs. 
 
Performance costs = the agreed price for the services rendered by contractors 
– the price if the collective system has its own recovery facilities. 
 
Alternative costs =  cost of regenerated base oils sold – income from producers 
participating in the collective system.  
 
On the second level of the model the ‘social public cost’ is measured 
as: 
First, the possible lack of public effect (additional contribution) 
from the operation of most of the collective systems for utilization of waste 
oils. According to the latest report published by the Executive Environment 
Agency (ExEA) in 2015, the percentage of recovered waste oils and waste oil 
products was 39% in 2009 and 44% in 2015 of the total quantity of these 
products released on the market in Bulgaria. There are two installations in the 
country with IPPC permits, both owned by commercial companies. One of 
them owns a collective recovery system as well. Their capacity exceeds the 
quantities reported in the EEA report (2015) as utilized by the total of 6 
collective systems registered in Bulgaria and three companies performing indi-
vidually their obligations. This leads to the conclusion that there is a high mar-
ket demand for this quantity of base oil from producers of motor, transmission 
and industrial oils, lubricants, bitumen, and heavy fuel, the commercial 
companies with IPPC permits could collect and recover the waste oils on their 
own even if there are no collective systems. The role of the collective systems 
is only to obtain statements for the regenerated waste. According to information 
from the National Social Security Institute, at the end of 2017 five of the 
collective waste oil utilization systems registered in Bulgaria had 2 employees 
and only system had 4 employees. This proves that collective waste oil recovery 
systems lack the necessary capacity. This conclusion complements the 
problems of the corporate governance of the Bulgarian commercial companies 
described by Tchipev (2009) and Zahariev (2014) in a context different from 
the context of eco-business.  
Second, the inability of collective systems to raise sufficient funds in 
order to create their own technical capacity for recovery of waste. If 
collective systems are allowed to create such capacity, the producers parti-
cipating in these systems will pay lower fees and will have more money to 
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invest in modern resource- and energy-efficient production technologies. This 
would reduce the total amount of all harmful emissions and benefit the society. 
This conclusion could be supported by the hypothesis of Porter and Van der 
Linde (1995).   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The number of research studies in the field of economic analysis of 
waste oil management is still insufficient. Moreover, the studies on environ-
mental transaction costs focus mainly on policies implemented on a national 
level and the costs incurred by those affected by these policies. Our study 
focuses on the transaction costs of a certain participant in the implementation 
of the environmental policy and thus to complement the overall picture of the 
existing transaction costs in this field.  
The lack of common and detailed European regulations regarding the 
collective systems bearing extended producer responsibility results in ineffi-
cient national legislations of the Member States and poses a risk of destroy the 
public trust in the waste management system.  
The proposal for creation of a ‘circular economy’ (COM / 2015/0595), 
which is expected to enter into force after 2019, has partially addressed this 
issue.  
Some of the positive aspects of the proposal are that it clarifies the 
ownership of collective systems and attempts to strengthen control over their 
financial management, but the provisions are too general and vague. Presently 
there are no specific audit standards for such control and one of the objectives 
of this study is to facilitate the development of such standards for the 
transaction costs of collective systems. We believe that most significant flaw 
of the new regulation is that it lacks incentives to encourage the collective 
systems to create their own technical capacity for recovery of waste. Although 
the collective systems accumulate a large amounts of financial resources, they 
have no right to share profits. The situation in Bulgaria shows that despite their 
large financial resources, they maintain a staff of 2 employees on average and 
the average value of their FTA is EUR 2000. At the same time, the almost equal 
utilization rate of waste oils for the last reported seven-year period (42% on 
average), as well as the capacity of the processing companies, which exceeds 
the utilized quantity, casts doubt on the contribution of the collective systems. 
The processing companies in Bulgaria carry out the full cycle of operations 
from collection of waste oils to production of finished products (base oils), 
which are no longer considered waste. Therefore, the collective systems do not 
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participate with their own capacity at any stage of the entire recovery cycle and 
thus created conditions for generation of social public costs.  
The methodology for reporting social costs in collective waste 
management systems is only marked as a basis for development of a second 
level of our model by using the output data from the transaction cost model for 
further analyses. Our final conclusion is that environmental transaction costs 
cannot be accounted separately from the related social costs and effects on 
public welfare. 
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